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Neoclassical growth theory holds that LiLe difference between
developed and developing countries is that the latter  have less human and non-
human capital.  The diagnosis prescribes the cure:  increase the capital
resources of developing countries and they  will grow, indeed they will grow
faster than developed countries per unit of capital input because the marginal
return will be higher.  Not only will there  be growth, but the benefits of
growth will be distributed widely if not equitably.
But as development experience suggests, (supported  by economic
literature)i the outcomes anticipated by the neoclassical model have not been
realizcd.  While one cannot deny that increases in capital resources are
necessary for development, they are not sufficient for sustainable growth and
the relief of poverty in developing countries.  In addition to capital
resources, there must be appropriate institutional  structures.
Experience with poverty reduction programs and sustainable
projects suggests that "appropriate" institutions  are important for
development for two main reasons.  First, in the absence of "appropriate"
institutional arrangements the  benefits from  major inflows of physical capital
tend to accrue to the elite and rarely reach the poor.  Second, such
institutions not only help to distribute  benefits more equitably, but also
will do something more important:  they  will contribute to the sustainability
of projects and thus to sustainable growth.  This critical link between
"appropriate" institutions  and sustainable  growth is supported broadly by the
World Bank's Annual Review of 2000 Evaluations (1988)  which found investment
1  See Joseph Stiglitz, "Markets  and Market Failures, and Development" in
AEA paper and proceeding, May 1989 pp. 19/-203,  other relevant  writing by
Stiglitz and others are cited in this paper.in institutional development to be the single most important determinant of
project sustainability.
Michael Cernea (1987) illustrates  these general points by
examining the impact of two  Worlc'  Bank-assisted projects, one a success and
the other a failure (See  Annex I for a more detailed review of Cernea's
analysis).  Seven years after the completion of the Hinvi Agricultural
Development Project in Benin an evaluation showed a negative rate of return.
There was little evidence of the investments  in a significant agricultural
technical package made less than a decade earlier.  Seventy-four percent of
the farmecs had dropped out of the inappropriate  cooperatives imposed upon
them from above and had returned to cultivating crops for subsistence.  There
was no sustainable growth and the poor remained  poor.
The Muda Irrigation Project in  Malaysia stands in sharp contrast.
An evaluation conducted approximately five  years after project completion
showed that the income of the farmers  was increasing  and some of  the increase
was being invested  back into the  project to sustain it.  In addition to the
physical inputs of an irrigation system, this  project had provided for local
water user organizations that  were carefully and patiently created following a
thorough analysis of farmer needs, propensity to cooperate, and other factors.
The evaluation attributed the success of the  project primarily to the user
organization and other grassroots institutions.
In each of the projects there  was a significant input of physical
resources and training.  In one, the additional  commitment to build
appropriate institutions--that is, to invest in institutional  development--
led to a distribution of some benefit to the poor who, in turn, put resources
into the continued maintenance and devrelopment  of the project.  This linkagei3-
between poor people's investment in sustainable activities distinguishes these
developmeLlt  projects from simple welfare schemes that may reduce misery, at
least in the short term, but do not equip the poor with the institutional
mechanisms that allow them to magnify the resources that have been invested.
Once one recognizes the importance  of institutions a difficult
question then arises:  what do appropriate institutions  look like?  Of most
direct relevance to this discussion are institutions that  have an
organizational structure like farmer cooperatives  or government ministries.
The kinds and combinations of "appropriate"  institutions that facilitate
sustainable growth, however, may vary considerably from sector to sector and
from place to place.  For example, a financial institution that successfully
provides credit to credit groups  will bear little resemblance to a research
station doing farming systems rpsearch on local smallholder agriculture.  But
development experience suggests that there are some general characteristics
that many of these "appropriate"  institutional  structures share.
It is the objective of this paper to describe and evaluate these
broad components.  The paper is divided into two parts:  first, it outlines
characteristics of institutions that  promote both economic growth and the
reduction of poverty; second, it addresses the  problems and prospects
encountered in developing institutions  which actively involve the poor.  A
wide variety of successful (and  relatively less successful) case studies are
used from different sectors and sub-sectors in both sections.  Cases were
chosen to provide insight into the lessons learned from institutional
initiatives and to convey the geographical and sectoral variety of successful,
poverty-orientad institutional  activities.- 4
II.  LESSONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL  DEVELOPMENT
Drawing on experience, thiis  section presents a more detailed
picture of effecti-e, pov-r.-y-oriented  institutional frameworks.  This is niot.
to suggest there is one model for successful inst.cutional  development:  the
kinds and combinations of institutions  to he supported may vary considerably
from sector to sector and from place to place (Uphoff  1986:19).  The aim,
therefore, is to map out the general coinponents  of institutional development
efforts (iD) that reach the poor and work to reverse the causes of poverty.
These components are of two varieties.  Two are concerned with
countries' broad institutional arrangements.  These include:
forming or strengthening local  organizations; and
allowing institutional  pluralism.
The other components describe specific institutional  characteristics:
*  building institutional  li,'kages;
*  adopting the appropriate  organizational structure and
encouraging strong managerial leadership;
v  adopting the learning  process approach; and
*  fostering  poor people's  participation and local resource
mobilization.
Although presented separately for clarity, these cr  -- onents and themes are
integrally linked, it would be difficult to introduce one without considering
the others.  For example, local organizations act as mech;nisms for poor
people's participation.
Two major themes underlie all components.  First, successful
i.istitutional  interventions are generally demand driven.  This means the poor
themselves shape initiatives  and capacities to meet their  needs.  Second, the
goal of development intervention should  be to help the poor help themselves.
This goal requires not only a resource  commitment, but a willingness to build
administrative and additional skills at the local levels.INSTITUTIONAL AJRRANGEMENTS
Local  organizations
Local organizations  commonly take the form of membership
organizations (for  example, user groups in irrigation  or credit, or women's
groups), local governments, service organizations (for example,
nongovernmental organizations),  private business or local administrations
(Uphoff 1986b:4-6).  Development experience suggests local organizations serve
two main purposes:  (a) they act as a vehicle for involvement,  and (b) they
enhance poor people's bargaining power and access to resources.  Where these
structures do not exist it may be necessary to employ special staff (catalyst/
community organizer) to help them form or be restructured,  design incentives
for participation and flexibility into the project, and train poor people in
basic organizational skills such as bookkeeping and leadership.
First, local organizations give poor people, including those
usually missed in traditional projects, a mechanism for participation.  In
Northern Pakistan, the successful  Aga Khan Rural Support Project model of
"organization and cooperative  management" is  based on the mass participation
of villagers through village-level and separate  women's organizations.  The
society's considerable gender stratification  makes this division necessary
(World Bank 1987, World Bank 1989a).  The village organizations allow
villagers with relatively homogeneous resources to group-manage irrigation and
common grazing land, and cooperate for the  purpose of commercial activities,
including viiiage-level investment in management of capital works, group
access to credit, and organized marketing (World  Bank 1987:b).
Second, local organizations improve the  poor's access to resources
and bargaining power.  For example, the National Farmers Association of- 6  -
Zimbabwe  (NFAZ),  an institution  comprised  of local  organizations  with  over
31,000 low-income member households, helps improve farmers' access to
information and marketing arrangemelits.  This association and other farmer
organizations  have  helped  sponsor  an informal  process  of technology  diffusion
which  by 1985  resulted  in 95  percent  OL  peasant  farmers  using  hybrid  seed  and
61 percent  using  chemical  fertilizers  on at least  one  of their  fields  (Brattoo
1988:9-10).
Further,  they  have  assisted  farmers  in  circumventing  unreliable
service  delivery  agencies  by organizing  their  own  transport  for  supply  and
marketing. As a result,  group  farmers  are  significantly  more  likely  than
individual  farmers  to  use  fertilizer,  and  to  obtain  this input  directly  from
urban  suppliers  at  cheaper  prices. Farmer  organization  facilitates  improved
access  to agricultural  technologies  and  services,  which  leads  ultimately  to
higher  agricultural  productivity  and  incomes. In 1982  in NFAZ's  Heartlani  of
Gutu  District,  Masvingo,  group  households  produced  more  than  twice  as much
maize--and  sold  more than  seven  times  as much--as  individual  households
(Bratton  1988:10).
Although  it  is generally  easier  and  better  to  use  existing
organizations  than  it is to  establish  new  ones,  there  must  be some  caution  in
us4ng  existing  local  institutions.  Since  communities  are  rarely  harmonious,
homogeneous  entities,  it is  quite  possible  that  traditional  organizations
reflect  the  interests  of the  elite. Community  organizers  may  help  mitigate
these  differences  to some  extent,  but  when  conflicts  are  strong  and  entrenched
it  may  be necessary  to  adopt  more  structural  approaches  (D.  Korten  1983:193).
For  example,  the  Bangladesh  Rural  Advancement  Committee  tried  for  several
years  to  develop  broad-based  community  groups. They  ultimately  concluded  that7-
the interests  of the  landed  and  the  landless  or  near-landless  were
sufficiently  irreconcilable  that  the  only  solution  was  to develop  separate
groups  (D.  Korten  1980:480-511).
There  can  be serious  disadvantages,  however,  to  establishing
separate  institutions  for  the  poor. These  institutions  may  become
marginalized  and.  receive  few  central  funds  because  the  I  or  wield  little
political  clout. They  can  also  contribute  to further  sociecal  stratification.
These  experiences  are  clearly  evident  in  the  US  where  social  welfare  spending
programs  to the  poor (increasirel1-  nonwhite  diser.franchised  groups)  have
fallen  at the  same  time  social  spending  for  senior  citizens  (increasingly  the
white,  middle  income  majority)  has  risen  substantially.  This inequality
results  in  large  part  from  the  fac-  that  senior  citizens  have  a strong
effective  political  lobby,  the  American  Association  for  Retired  Persons,  while
poor  minorities  do not.
It is  also  important  to  mentio-i  that  although  the  examples
provided  above  involve  grassroots  programs,  in  some  situations  "top-down"  or
centrally-managed  local  institutions  can  be successful.  Newly-industrializing
country  (NIC)  experience  in  Korea  and  Singapore,  for  example,  suggests  that
central-level  decisionmaking  and  goal  setting  merged  with  mobilization  at the
local  can  lead  to rapid  growth. But  there  are  many  social  and  historical
features  unique  to the  NICs  experience  that  would  be difficult  to replicate
in,  for  example,  Latin  America  or Africa. In  contrast  regimes  such  as China
or  Tanzania,  that  have  built  top-down  local  institutions  (usually  government
cooperatives)  focused  on extracting  resources  for  national  consumption  over
local  control. These  top-down  institutions  have  had greater  success  in social
sectors  than  in  productive  sectors. In  some  cases,  productivity  has actually-8-
declined  when local  comniunitie-  have too  little  authority. Recognizing  the
limication  of these  centralized  structures,  many  governments,  such  as China,
the  Soviet  UnioLn,  and  many  countries  in  Eastern  Europe,  have  evolved  towards
more local  ownershi.
Institutional  p1uralism
Building  local  organizations  is  an important  part of a larger
strategy  that  suggests  the  need  for  complementary  and  competitive
organizations  in the  public,  private  and  nongovernmental  sectors 2. In  other
words,  the  poor  benefit  from  institutional  pluralism.  As "the  poor"  are  a
heterogeneous  group,  and  some  are  harder  to  reach  than  others,  organizations
have  varying  capacities  to  work  with  people  living  in  different  conditions  of
poverty. In the  area  of microenterprise,  Crinole,  Mann,  and  Shipton  (1987:33-
50)  find  that  because  of their  relatively  small  size  and  focus,  voluntary
organizations  and  certain  government  agencies  that  have  adopted  a  multi-
service  approa.h 3 (for  example,  the  Ministry  of Social  Services  and
Development  in  India)  may  be the  most  appropriete  institutions  for  reaching
the  poorest  entrepreneurs.
These  authors  argue  that  cooperatives  and  certain  types  of
government  agencies  may  be best  at reaching  poor  people  at slightly  higher
income  levels. They  suggest  that  the  need  to  maintain  cooperative  forms  of
organization  and the  existence  of considerable  government  regulation  and
2  See  Uphoff  and  Esman  (1974)  and (1984).
3 In  microenterprise,  agencies  seeking  to reach  the  poorest
microentreprenuers  directly  and  effectively,  may  have  to  provide  a number  of
services  including,  for  example,  credit,  technical  assistance,  training,  and
social  promotion  interventions  since  the  poorest  tend  to  possess  extremely
limited  access  to information  and  human  and  financial  capital.-9-
oversight of cooperatives tend to limit the adaptability and creativity of
these institutions.  This limited flexibility, in turn, may restrict their
ability to reach ,  e very poorest who demand the  most specialized input.
Cooperatives that have managed to be more responsive to their local membership
because of strong equity-minded leadership (for  example, the National Dairy
Development Board in India) and/or participatory components (for example, the
National Farmers Association and the Saving Development Foundation in
Z-mbabwe), are exceptions to this general tendency.
Grindle et al. argue that  banks and business associations may be
most appropriate for reaching the most well-off low-income small and
microentrepreneurs.  Because  bank procedures and regulations  must be uniform
and must be applied to broad categories  of clients if their activities are to
be efficient, they may be ill-suited  to deal with the  poorest, most difficult
to reach groups.  Banks that are committed to community development and social
welfare goals are inportant exceptions to this general tendency.  Examples
include  Multi-service centers of the Bank of Baroda; the Banco Del Pacifico in
Ecuador; the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh; the Badan  Kredit Kecamatan (BKK)
banks in Indonesia;  and the South Shore Bank in the United States.
Comparative advantage among organizations requires that agencies
with different skills and resources cooperate in order to reach all low-
income groups.  This has led to incr'_asing  incidence  of NGO-government
cooperation as governments take advantage of NGO flexibility and grassroots
orientation while NGOs benefit from central resources (Paul 1988:65).  For
example, in the Alwar district of Rajasthan,  PRADAN, an Indian NGO has been
working with the government Integrated  Rural Development Project (IRDP)
officials to improve  effectiveness of Poverty  Alleviation Programs at the- 10  -
Block level  with considerable success in Improved  targeting and loan
repayment.  Similarly, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) has
also demonstrated that it can provide effective, low-cost services (efforts so
far have emphasized immunization)  for the  Government in rural areas.
CHARACTERISTICS OF POVERTY-ORIENTED INSTITUTIONS
Inistitutional  linkages
Linkages have considerable implications  for implementation
(Leonard 1982:37).  Institutional linkages in an institutional development
(ID) strategy should be structured so that communications can flow back and
forth between central, intermediate  and local levels, and development
officials are accountable both to the clients at the  bottom and central
leaders at the top.  This will require emphasizing  linkages that encourage
representation of interests.
In their book, Institutions  of Rural Development for the Poor,
which reviews developed and developing  country experiences with poverty
programs editors, David Leonard and Dale  Marshall (1982) identify five types
of center-local liinkages.  These include:
a)  representation (for  example,  various forms of formal and
informal  participation in  planning and implementing  programs
or political parties);
b)  technical and personnel  assistance (for  example, in-service
training, management and program advice);
c)  regulations and monitoring (for  example, audits,
administered  market prices, registration  of local
organizations);
d)  services (for example,  provision of inputs); and
e)  finance (for example,  credit, grants, savings) (Leonard
1982:35).I  11  -
These mechanisms involve  various mixes of control and assistance.  Control
linkages enable one organization to  determine some aspect of another's
performance, while assistance linkages facilitate  program implementation  by
compensating for gaps in the performance  of implementing  organizations.  The
ID strategy should stress assistance linkages (that is, representation and
technical assistance) over control linkages (that is, regulation or input
delivery) as the former create incentives  for increased local commitment and
capacity to implement development  programs (Marshall 1982:59-66).
The value of institutional  linkages  and central-local
communications flow is exemplified in the area of agricultural research and
extension.  In their in-depth study of small farmer agriculture in Africa,
MADIA4 researchers found that in some countries, despite massive investments
in extension and research, relatively  little of this knowledge was adopted by
small farmers.  The technologies that  were developed (for  example, high-
yielding varieties, HIYVs,  that require significant inputs of fertilizer and
water) did not reflect the realities of small farmer resources.  For example,
less than five percent of farmers in Malawi have adopted hybrid maize despite
thirty plus years of maize-breeding  work and twenty years of agricultural
development projects (Lele,  Kinsey, and Obeya 1989:26).  This results
partially from the fact that information  has flowed only one way: from the
researcher to the farmer (Lele,  Kinsey, and Obeya 1989:27).  The important
4  The Managing Agricultural Development in  Africa (MADIA)  study involved
a detailed analysis of six African countries'  policies and performance over
the last 20-25 years.  The countries included:  Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania,
Cameroon, Nigeria, and Senegal.- 12  -
link that would allow researchers  to do more location-specific research--
farmer-to-researcher communication--was  not developed.
Agricultural research and extension have emphasized control
linkages such as input delivery, and put relatively less effort into
developing assistance linkages that focus on trying to heighten the poor's
representation in agricultural research.  Whereas control linkages are
sufficient for delivering technologies  that are robust and usable in a wide
range of  conditions (for example, some  handpumps), they are inappropriate for
technologies that require two-way information flow  between researchers and
farmers (for example, farming system research requiring location-specific
knowledge about farmers' access to inputs,  cropping patterns, and the
heterogeneity of the resources employed).
One agricultural project that has put greater effort into trying
to incorporate farmers input into research is the Rural Women's Agricultural
Development Project in Bihar, India.  In this farming system research
experiment, strong linkages  between poor tribal  women, the Bisra University
agricultural researchers, and female extension  workers have led to increased
yields and incomes.  Women extension agents  have fed information from poor
tribal women in the drought-prone  Chotanagpur  plateau to scientists at the
University, who, in turn, have developed  a simple dug well system to provide
irrigation for vegetable gardening during the dry season.  This lucrative
undertaking led to five-fold increases in annual household incomes (Singh  and
Baha, 1988, cited in Women and Development Division 1989a:64).  (See  Annex 2
for more detai'l  on FSR, and agricultural  research and extension in India.)13
Orgeanization  strtuctulre  anid  managerial  leadership
Both organizational structure  and managerial leadership have
proven to be important components of effective  poverty-oriented institutions.
The aspects of these two issues that are relevant for institutions  working in
poverty reduction are highlighted below.
There is  no single ideal form  of organization that is most
effective and efficient in all situations  and circumstances.  The best
organizational structure is contingent on the decision environment in which
the organization is operating.  There is a large  body of literature that
supports these propositions.  The research that is most relevant to
institutions concerned with poverty reduction  has been done by Lawrence and
Lorsch.  They clearly demonstrated that  when the decision environment is
marked by great uncertainty, the  most effective organizations depart markedly
from the Weberian ideal of a rational  bureaucracy--clear lines of command,
explicit non-overlapping role assignments,  etc.  Instead, chains cf command
are somewhat ambiguous as are role assignments.
One of the specific findings is that within an organization where
different operating units have different time horizons, it is necessary to
have individuals assigned as coordinators  between these units.  For example,
production divisions have time horizons of hours or days, marketing divisions,
of weeks or a few months, applied research, a year or two, basic research a
number of years.  People in these different  units have difficulty
communicating with one another without going through an intermediary.  By
contrast, organizations whose environment is relatively certain do best if
they are organized along classic  Weberian lines.- l  -
The  Lawrence  and  Lorsch  ifindings  are  re levanit  to  institut  ionls
designed  to reduce poverty.  In some  situations,  there  is  a  great  deal  of
uncertainty  in  this  decision  environment.  Little  may  be  known  about the micro
social structure in which agencies are operating,  and people's response to
opportunities may be relatively  unknown.  There are clearly different time
horizons in different parts of the organizations.  Those who work directly
with the poor in activities such as group organizing and training will be on a
completely different schedule from those  who are building the irrigation
channel, or those who are researching new irrigation  designs.  Many
institutions designed to reduce poverty, however, are organized along fairly
classic Weberian lines.  Consequently, it  may be necessary to introduce
considerable bureaucratic reorientation 5 to make them effective in the
decision making environment in which they operate.
The National Irrigation  Administration (NIA) in the Philippines is
an example of a public bureaucracy that has restructured its  mode and culture
away from the classic bureaucratic model to reflect a more flexible
organizational structure (D.  Korten 1988:117-142).  For example, it has
employed interdisciplinary  problem-solving teams to work as intermediaries
with the various NIA staff  workers who do different tasks  which require
different time horizons.  Further, some of these officials, especially those
working at the grassroots level,  operate in uncertain environments which means
that a considerable amount of social learning must take place before programs
5  An extensive literature exists on bureaucratic reorientation.  See
Cernea (1983), "A Social Methodology for Community Participation in Local
Investments:  the experience of Mexico's PIDER program",  World Bank Staff
Working Paper No. 598,  Washington D.C.: Bryant and White (1984); Ickis et al.,
(1986);  Uphoff (1986b); and Korten and Uphoff (1981).- 15 -
can be appropriately implemented.  The problem-solving teams work with
farmers, community organizers, the  design and construction and post
construction engineers, and the provincial engineer responsible for the
overall coordination of entire provinces'  communal irrigation programs.
Moreover, these teams have the authority to make dccisions and are also held
responsible to their client groups.  The use of community organizers (mostly
coliege educated females), participatory farmer user organizations, and
problem solving teams that are accountable  both to farmers and engineers,
marks a clear departure from the classic bureaucratic model.
The impact of this new bureaucratic system on farmer satisfaction
and commitment, is remarkable.  Farmers' resource contribution to the
irrigation schemes, a barometer of farmer satisfaction  exemplifies this
success.  The National Irrigation  Administration in the Philippines introduced
the new system, in part, because of chronic budget problems.  For example, in
1964-65, irrigation fee collections totalled  only 1.27 million pesos while
operation and maintenance expenses were 3.42 million pesos (Bagadion 1988:5).
In 1967 the NIA attempted to solve its chronic  budget deficit for operation
and maintenance by increasing  water fees.  But farmers  were reluctant to pay
the higher fee and operation and maintenance costs for NIA rose simultaneously
so that the percentage of collectible fees actually paid decreased from 59
percent to 27 percent (Bagadion 1988:7).  In  contrast, in areas where the new
more participatory system  has been introduced  farmers have been more willing
to at least approach, if  not meet, the governments financial requirements--10
percent of the system's cost and all of operations  and maintenance costs.  For
example, farmer mean equity contribution for construction  per hectare of
irrigated land in the 1985 wet season  was 357 pesos in the participatory- 16  -
system verses 54 pesos in the non-participatory  system (Reyes and Jopillo
1988:109) (see  Table 1).
Table 1  Farmers' equity contribution to construction costs
(in  pesos)
Participatory  Non-participatory
Basis for measuring  systems  systems
contribution  (n=21)  a/  (n-22)
Farmers' mean equity
contribution per hectare  357  b/  54




wet season system user  348  44
a. Data on the farmers' contribution to system construction costs were not
available for three systems in which construction  had not been completed.
b. Contributions are standardized in terms  of 1984  pesos:  P20-US$1.00.
Source:  de los Reyes and Jopillo in Korten and Siy, Jr. (1988:109).
At the same time, however, there are institutions concerned with
poverty reduction, particularly those doing major infrastructure  projects-
building roads that improve access to markets or central station electric
power, that are working in a different  environment.  These kinds of
institutions  will not have to undertake the types of social learning
activities that are required  by community level workers.  Their environment is
more certain, which suggests that a more classic  bureaucratic form may be the
most effective and the most efficient for these institutions.
In the area of managerial leadership  a number of different factors
have proven central.  Specifically, leadership,  leadership's link to powerful17
political figures and insti  Lutions,  and leadership  continuity have proven to
be import  atit  factors in successful institutional  managemrit.  Judith Teridler,
in an assessmnernt  of five successful  NCOs involved in the Ford Foundation's
Livelihood, Employment, and Income  Generation program, finds that all five
NGOs6 are led by strong and driveni  individuals  who, through class or previous
work experience, have links to important  institutions  and political figures.
For example, though the Grameen Bank is  now an independent financial
institution, it found its first institutional  home in the Central Bank as an
experimental project.  When Grameen became its own bank, the link to the
Central Bank continued informally,  partly through the three Central Bank
professionals who went on extended leave to take managerial positions with
Grameen (Tendler 1987:26).
In addition, in  his study  of six7 successful  public sector
development programs, Paul (1982)  argues for the importance  of leadership
continuity.  Paul illustrates that in all of the cases studied, the person who
initiated the project as an experiment  was the same to carry out the
transition to a nation-wide program:  In other words, it  was the energy of the
single leader that drove the successful  expansion of the program, not just the
force of a particular organizational  model.
6  She reviews the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, the Self-Employed Women's
Association of Ahmadebad, the Working Women's Forum of Madras (WWF), the
Annapurna Caterers of Bombay, and Environmental  quality International (EQI)
working in conjunction with the association  of Zabaleen garbage collectors in
Cairo.
7 Paul's high performers include the  National Dairy Development Program
of India, the Indonesian Population  Program, the Philippine  Rice Development
Program (Masagzna 99), the Public  Health Program  of China, the Smallholder Tea
Development Program of Kenya, and the  Mexican Rural Education Program
(CONAFE).- 18 -
Given this finding, it is not surprising that a common critique of
successful management in  poverty-oriented projects is that organizational
effectiveness results from charismatic leadership which cannot be replicated
or maintained,  But there are many important  examples of strong leadership
that has been institutionalized--for  example, with laws and regularized
procedures, and where the government  has chosen the correct "charismatic"
person for the leadership  position.  This experience is illustrated by the
Indian National Dairy Development Board  which has been built up to a national
program from the model of the  Anand Milk Producer's  Union of Gujurat State
under the direction of one of its  original leaders,  Verghese Kurien.
Strong leadership,  however, is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for effective ID.  As the NIA study suggests, management and
organizational linkages are also necessary components of effective
institutional structures.  These factors  should be incorporated into project
design, although in this context design should  not be equated with "blueprint"
planning.  As C scussed below, the most successful  poverty programs are often
"designed" to ai-ow for flexibility  and adaptation.
The  learning  process  avproach
The 1980s have witnessed an evolution of thinking about planning
and implementing development projects,  away from the blueprint to the more
open-ended "learning process" approach.  This approach rejects fixed planning
and calls for more experimental and adaptive forms of design and
implementation.8  This type of incremental  decisionimaking  is decentralized
8 This approach is continually  evolving.  A professional group known as
this Development Management Network meets at least once a year to discuss
cases and develop the approach as a concept.- 19
and based on information flow  and feedback  mechaniisms  that allow projects to
evolve to fit local conditions best.  Further, it suggests the need to start
small and experiment with different pilot projects before trying to Pxpand
programs across countries or regions.
Local institutional  development requires a learning-by-doing
approach for the following reasons:
a)  localities'  heterogeneity demands that different approaches
be developed for disparate areas;
b)  little is known about the obstacles poor people confront or
the best means to overcome them; and
c)  institutional  development takes time and outcomes may be
different from initial appearances:  Successes can sometimes
collapse and failures may turn out to be successful (Smith
et al, 1982).
The Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) in Ahmadebad, India,
r.  large grassroots NGO, demonstrates the need for an adaptive approach.
Incremental decision-making based on information from the project activities
has allowed the local institution  to alter its credit program substantially to
better reflect the needs of its  clientele.  Initially SEWA worked through
nationalized Indian banks to get credit to its  members. This arrangement ran
into difficulties as the banks were ill-prepared  to deal with illiteracy among
their clientele, to provide small enough loans to meet the  women's needs, or
to act as a saving depository for poor women who had only small deposits to
make and did not live near any bank branches.  SEWA responded in 1974 by
starting its own "mobile" saving  unit that went directly to the women's homes
and places of employment to collect savings.  By 1981 the Bank had 13,639
savings accounts with over Rs. 3,000,000.  These savings are now reinvested in
the community through loans to SEWA members.- 2()
ll.is  process  wa!;  iiOt  cri-  ted  overlni,"ht  SE.WA start  ed  sn  11 .. s an
intermediary  between  nationalize(d  bankls  and  poor  women  in  19i2.  hltn  t he
organizacion's  feedback  mechanisms  indicated  that  this  arrangement  was  proving
unsatisfactory, SEWA evolved into a saving mobilizing unit and then eventually
into a lending institution.  In  her review of SEWA Bank, Jennifer Sebstad
attributes the Bank's success, in part, to its  ability to respond to and
understand its members' needs and its  willingness to learn from the
established bankiitg  community and to experiment  with new ideas--the learning
process approach (Sebstad, 1982:118).
Larger development institutions  concerned with poverty reduction
have also adopted this approach.  For example, the International Fund for
Agricultural Development began with a few basic concepts and a specific target
group--smallholder farms, rural  women, landless and other marginalized rura'
populations.  It did not begin with a set of tenets in place. Its priorities
and modalities evolved out of actual operations as lessons were absorbed, and
led to changes and refinements in  project design (IFAD 1989:1).
Participation and local  resource mobilization
In  this  context,  participation  is used to mean the poor's
influence in decisionmaking in poverty reduction programs. 9 Local resource
9 This narrow definition is used because it is appropriate for the
context--institutions in  poverty reduction schemes in the productive sectors.
Nevertheless, some argue that a primary goal of poverty reduction should be to
enable the poor to demand and control more of the  benefits of development
(Chambers, 1983:140).  The implication  of this type of argument is that the
poor must be able to influence  national allocational  decisions if they are to
get appropriate access to resource.  Although not necessarily inconsistent
with the narrower definition used here, this argument is concerned with the
powerlessness of the poor, and therefore lies outside the scope of this paper.- 21
mobil  I zationl  is  incIuded  wit  Ii  part  i  ipat  i on  berause  a  coimnitinentt  of  1  ocal
resources  - -tilne,  labor,  or1  c-api  t al  - - increases  poor  .1oplI(-  '  inlvohvement  /
participat  ioni  in  design,  operationi,  and  maintenance  of  an  endeavor  arnd  thereby
provides  a mechanism for influencing  decisions.
Although  the  1980s  have  witnessed  a  trenid  toward  participatory
approaches among a number of national governments  and developmerit
organizations, poor people's participation remains  a controversial issue for
two reasons.  First, it  has political consequences  when it leads to pressure-
group formation that chajlenges existing power structures.  Second, public,
private, and non-governmental agencies are reluctant to foster participation
when they feel the costs involved (political,  financial,  and administrative)
are not worth the benefits.  Further,  poor people may also demonstrate
reservations concerning participation.  It is unlikely that they will
participate for the sake of participating.  Participation is an investment,
and poor people will consider making this investment in light of the returns
they anticipate rectiving.  The implication  here is that if participation is
to occur, there must be incentives  to participate (Bryant  and White 1984:9).
Given these potentially constraining  factors, some may question
the need for participation.  But experience suggests that participation will
be a necessary component of effective and sustainable  poverty reduction
programs under the following conditions:
a)  when the poor possess information  not known to outsiders
that is  necessary for program success;
b)  when collective action is required for effective management;
and- ?2 -
c)  whten  goverunents must relv on poor people to expand the
public resources  that  are  put  into projects.10
Participation  has  proven  to be critical  to  the  following
productive  sectors  and  sub-sectors:
a)  agriculture,  which  includes the sub-sectors of forestry,
livestock, irrigation,  and agricultural  extension;
b)  rural  water supply;
c)  urban development and in some instances,  urban water supply;
d)  environment and resettlement (World Bank 1989); and
e)  credit, particularly group lending schemes, and micro-
enterprise (Grindle  et al., 1987).
It may also be important for road  maintenance, (Cook  cited in World Bank 1989)
and labor union activity.  In contrast, participation is not essential in
sectors that require large and lumpy  capital investment  such as electrical
power or transportation.
Examples from a few of the more participatory sectors demonstrate
the impact representation can have on projects.  First, in the area of
livestock development, about 50 percent of World Bank first generation
projects undertaken in the 1970s, failed  primarily because they ignored local
social and ecological conditions (World  Bank's review of African Livestock
10  Community resources can expand  programs considerably  when they use
traditional methods of resource  mobilization (commitment  of labor and funds),
and train locals as paraprofessionals  whenever possible to carry out the tasks
of outsiders.  See Milton Esman, Paraprofessionals  in Rural Development:
Issues in field-level staffing for agricultural  projects, (Washington  D.C:
World Bank Staff Working Paper #573,cl983).- 23 -
projects cited in  W.orld  Bank 1989).  In chese  cases, the poor possessed
information about their micro social structure  not known to outsiders that
proved essential to effective implementation  and sustainability.  In contrast,
second generation World Bank projects that  have given a prominent role to
pastoral or herder associations have met with much greater success.  For
example, the pastoral associations introduced  in Zaire have improved
pastoralist' access to veterinary drugs and services and have led to the
establishme-t of a federation of associations called the Association des
Cooperatives d'Eleveurs de l'Ituri (ACOOPELI).  Acoopeli has come to play an
integral  part in implementation:  it  has taken over activities, including the
management of the abattoir, originally entrus ed to the  Government's
comparatively ineffective livestock  parastatal,  ONDE.
In rural water supply, development agencies  have become convinced
of the need for popular participation.  In the 1970s, development agencies'
main emphasis was the development and installation  of durable, easy-to-fix
hand pumps.  But a high proportion of the systems installed  have fallen into
disrepair and become useless.  In Tanzania, for example,  water schemes with a
capacity to serve more than 40 percent of the rural population have been
constructed, but only ten to fifteen  percent actually benefit from these
sche..ies  because most schemes ceased to function  or are not utilized properly
(Therkildsen 1989:1).  The successful  exceptions  have been distinguished by
strong community participation.  In Kenya's  Kwale project, for example, social
extension agents work with local women's groups.  Pumps are installed only
after local groups have decided that they really  want a pump and have
demonstrated their capacity to operate and maintain it (including the levying
fees).  In Malawi's Rural Piped Water Supply Program,  community participation24  -
in water supply has helped the  Government to provide one million people with
reliable and accessible water. Communities  managinig  the water facilities are
responsible for identifying sites, electing watt  r  committees, organizing
distribution, electing repair teams, raising funds for replacement parts and
enforcinig  water use rules,  (For examples  of participation in irrigation and
credit see Annex 3).
As illustrated above, participation  can have the following
benefits.  First, increased participation  can enhance project effectiveness
because poor people's input  helps to identify  needs and local constraints.
Second, participation can increase  project targeting  by reducing leakages to
elites.  Third, local resource  mobilization can play a very important role in
generating local commitment to  program goals.  Fourth, peoples' involvement
can reduce the financial and administrative  pressures on overextended
governments when it includes local resources  mobilization and human resources
development (for example, training local  communities to operate and maintain
rural water supplies) components.  Fifth, these factors contribute
substantially to program financial  and institutional  sustainability.
Participation of the poor, however, can be difficult to
accomplish because the hurdles confronted can be formidable.  Obstacles come
from  within the community (for  example, poor communication facilities, local
factionalism and corruption), development agencies (for  example, centralized
decision-making and bureaucratic orientation),  and the policy environment (for
example, laws that discourage participation) (F.  Korten 1983:181 - 200).- 25  -
III.  PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Investing irn  poverty-oriented institutional  development may
require alternative methods of planning, evaluating, funding, and implementing
poverty reduction programs.  Moreover, the  approach does not necessarily
produce quick, easy or cheap results.  Consequently,  many governments and
development agerncies  are skeptical about the feasibility of ID approaches as
part of their proiects and programs.  More specifically,  objections to
poverty-oriented institutional  development efforts emphasize:
*  the costs versus the benefits of such approaches;
*  the scale on which they can operate;
i  their compatibility  with conventional  project frameworks,
*  the degree and types  of decentralization they require, and
*  their political feasibility.
This section of the paper will address these issues,  and with the use of case
studies, it  will illustrate that these criticisms  may be misleading.
COSTS AND BENEFITS
Investing in institutional  interventions that seek to organize the
poor and develop indigenous  management capacity may entail both increased
administrative costs and higher up front costs for activities such as
community organizing and management training.  But increased  administration
costs may be justified when they lead to returns on investment  which are
sustainable over a longer  period, more equitable  distribution of benefits, and
improvements in non-pecuniary indicators  of poor peoples living standards (for
example, reductions in the incidence  of dowry).  Moreover, there is strong
evidence to suggest that the need for financial  assistance will fall overtime
as a result of declining cost structures,  and when early efforts are made to- 26 -
create capacity for local resource  mobilization (USAID 1989).  A brief
analysis of two successful pro-poor institutions  demonstrates ID's potential.
The National Irrigation Administration
In their chapter "The Impact  of Participation,"  Romana de los
Reyes and Sylvia Jopillo (1988:90-116)  assess the impact of non-participatory
versus participatory irrigation systems.  They illustrate  many of the benefits
that have resulted from adopting a more participatory institutional approach,
such as relatively higher rice yields and hectares irrigated, and the greater
representation of landless and small farmers in  water user association
leadership positions.  This essay, however, will focus only on their findings
that pertain to costs and area irrigated.
First, the researchers show that although the cost of the
participatory system exceeds that of the  non-participatory system, it only
does so by a very small amount (merely $2  more per hectare).  This results
from the fact that the non-participatory  system costs more per hectare for the
design and construction (see  Table 2 for cost break down of the two systems).
Second, they demonstrate that despite the  higher costs, the benefits
associated with the institutional activities  made them  well worth the
investment for three main reasons:
a)  the participatory system mobilized local resources far
surpassing those of the non-participatory system;
b)  loan repayments  have been significantly  higher under the
participatory system;  and
c)  the area of land irrigated  has expanded more under the
participatory system than the non-participatory system
especially during the dry season.
These factors also contribute to sustainability.- 27 -
Table 2  Institutions, design and construction costs per hectare of wet season
irrigated land (in  pesos)
Participatory  Non-participatory
systems  systems
Type of cost  (n  24)  (n  22)
Institutional costs
Profile preparations  36 ($  1.80)  -
Community organizer
salaries and field
supplies  293 ($  14.65)  -
Community organizer
training and supervision  82 ($  4.10)  -
Financial and system
management training for
irrigation associations  87 ($  4.35)  -
Total institutional costs  498 ($  24.90)  -
Design &  construction costsb
Chargeable to farmers  12,666 ($633.30)  12,000 ($600.00)
Not chargeable to farmers  2,484 ($124.20)  3,599 ($179.95)
Total design and
construction costs  15,150 ($757.50)  15,599 ($780.00)
Total development costs  15,648 ($782.40)  15,599 ($780.00)
a. Costs have been standardized in terms of 1984 pesos: P20-US$1.00.
b. Includes costs of materials, labor, equipment rental and technical
supervision.
Source:  de los Reyes and  .)pillo  in Korten and Siy, Jr (1988:113).
The difference between the resources mobilized under the
participatory system versus the non-participatory  are startling.  Farmers'
mean equity contribution to construction costs under the participatory schemes
has been 357 pesos compared with only 54 pesos under the non-participatory
(see Table 1).  Similarly, comparing loan repayment rates, we find that the
mean percentage of amortization due that has been paid equals 87 percent for- 28  -
participatory schemes versus oiily  50 percerLt  for non-participatory schemes
(see  Table 3).
Given these statistics,  de los Reyes and Jopillo (1988:112)
demonstrate that from NIA's perspective, the financial  benefits associated
with the institutional  activities have been substantial.  The higher farmer
equity contribution to construction--303  pesos (US$15)  per hectare greater for
the participatory system--has led to an immediate recovery of 61 percent of
the cost of the institutional  development activities.  Moveover, loan
repayment rates have averaged 87 pesos per hectare per year more for
participatory than for non-participatory schemes.  If that differential rate
of repayment is main-jined for a total  of five years, the remaining 39 percent
of the cost of the participatory method would be recovered, and any further
differential payments would provide a direct positive financial benefit to the
NIA.  In financial investment terms, if the differential repayment remains
constant over ten years, the annual financial  rate of return on the investment
of using the participatory methods would be 25 percent.  Similar results have
been found in the Sri Lankan Gal Oya irrigation  system that is based on the
Philippines model.  The measurable benefit/cost ratio for the first two years
alone was 1.5 to one (Uphoff  1987:211).  In both irrigation schemes, the more
participatory approach has contributed substantially to financial
sustainability.
The Philippine participatory system also led to relatively higher
benefits in terms of the expansion of the area irrigated.  An analysis of the
mean areas irrigated before and after the NIA's construction assistance under
the two schemes shows that on average the NIA assistance  produced a positive
effect for both the participatory and the non-participatory systems.  In the- ?9
Tab 1 e  3  (Con  t rue  t  ion  and  I oan rtepayinint
Part  icipatory  Nonparticipatory
systemlls  svst  ellsl
Payment  (n  11)  a/  (n  19)  b/
Mean amortization
payment due a/  15,088  41,667
Mean amortization payment
remitted to the NIA  12,429  21,065
Mean % of amortization
due actually paid  82%  50%
(z  2.17;  p<0.05)
a.  Of the twenty-four sample participatory  systems, four  were still under
construction during the research fieldwork,  one had no loan because the
association raised a 30 percent equity, and two were not yet due to begin
paying their amortization.
b.  Of the twenty-two sample  nonparticipatory systems, two associations had
not accepted the final turnover of the system,  while one association had no
loan because it raised a 30 percent equity.
c.  Nonparticipatory systems had larger amortization  payments due because most
had been completed in 1981.  A larger  proportion of participatory systems were
completed in 1982 and 1983.
Source:  de los Reyes and Jopillo, 1988:111 in Korten and Siy, Jr.
wet season, expansion has been similar ,or the two types of systems--18
percent for participatory and 17 percent for nonparticipatory. In the dry
season, however, there has been a substantial  difference  between the two
systems:  under the participatory systems the area irrigated expanded by 35
percent in contrast to only 18 percent under the nonparticipatory schemes (see
Table 4).  Jopillo and de los Reyes (1988:98)  speculate that the difference in
dry season expansion may reflect better water management practices (for
example, more efficient water rotations) in the participatory systems as- 30  -
indicated by their greater use of water rotation and of specially designated
water management personnel.





Time period  (n=24)  (n=22)
Wet season
Before the project  88 ha  127 ha
Crop year 1984-85  104 ha  149 ha
Expansion  16 ha  22 ha
Expansion as a percent of  18%  17%
area irrigated before the
project  (z=0.08;p<0.21)
Dry season
Before the project  56  ha  105 ha
Crop year 1984-85  76  ha  123 ha
Expansion  20  ha  19 ha
Expansion as a percent of  35%  18%
area irrigated  before the
project  (z-1.38;p<0.08)
Source:  de los Reyes and Jopillo in Korten and Siy, Jr (1988:97)
The  Grameen  Bank
The second case used to illustrate  ID potential, the Grameen Bank,
demonstrates both the financial  and the social  benefits that can accompany
institutional development investment.  Investing in institutional  arrangements
in credit can produce dramatic financial  results when they lead to reductions
in arrears.  In their article, "Credit for the Rural Poor: A Comparison of the
Policy Experiments in Nepal and Bangladesh,"  Mosley and Dahal (1987) analyze- 31
the impact of ilnvesting  in  certain institutional  design features on the
effectiveness of credit for the poor programs, the Grameen Bank (GB), the
Small Farmers Development Program in  Nepal (SFDP),  and the average of 38 Small
Farmer Credit Institutions (SFCI).  They have defined effectiveness by
repayment rates and the credit institution's  ability to reach its target
group.
The authors show that GB investment in organizing groups, resource
mobilization (for example, compulsory  contribution to an Emergency Fund) and
intensive supervision of loan repayment (for  example, weekly collection of
repayment on borrowers premises) raises its  administrative cost.  Grameen's
administrative costs as a percentage of total lent out in 1984 were 12.3 (GB)
vs. 7.6 percent (SFDP) and 4.68 percent (SFCIs) (see  Table 5).  This
investment  has had two major benefits.  First, from a financial perspective,
it  has led to considerable increases in repayment rates which translates into
major reductions in arrears rates (see  Table 6 for statistics and definition
of arrears rate).  In 1983/84 Grameen Bank's arrears rate was 1.6 compared to
11.7(SFDP) and 39 (SFCIs).  These high repayment rates  have contributed to
Grameen Bank's ability to cover costs and sometimes even make a profit (given
its access to low cost credit--see Table 7)11.  SFCIs, in contrast, have made
few investments in ID.  Their average overdue rate of 39 percent--which
results from political pressures for loan distribution  and lack of specialized
11 This profit figure is  complicated  by the fact that GB has access to
low-cost credit (2.0-3.0  percent a year), but, a. discussed above, it is
currently going through a period of substantial  expansion  which may justify
the subsidy on infant industry if not equity grounds.IaIble  )  Adillinistirative  costs  ill  relittion  to  arrears  rates,  1984
Smnall  farmers'
development  Average of 38
programnme  third  world
(Grameen  bank  Nepal  sclhemes
Admini  stn  at  ive
costs as a % of
total lent out  12.3  7.6  4.68
Arreairs  rate  1.6  11.7  39.00
Sources:  Arrears rates.  Table 3a abo"s and World Bank [1984],  Annex 12;
administrative costs from  World Bank [1094],  Annex 13.  Hossain [1985]  page
72, and Agricultural Development Bank of Nopal [1986b).  Cited in Mosley and
Dahal (1987:53).
Table  Comparison  of indicators  of internal  efficiency
1977/78  1978/79  1979/80  1980/81  1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85
(1)  Arrears  rate  (%)
SFDP,  NepaL  4.5  16.2  25.1  26.6  io.8  13.0  13.6  17.8
Grameen Bank  (a)  ..  . ..  ..  ..  4.2  1.6  1.4
Bangladesh  (b)  ..  ..  ..  16.9  13.5  11.9  11.7
(ii)  Profitability  (%)
SFDP,  Nepal  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..
Grameen  Bank  ..  ..  ..  ..
Bangladesh  ..  ..  ..  -6.4  -9.5  -3.1  -10.2  17.6
Notes: Arrears  rate  for  a give  period  is Amount  overdue
(total  amount  due)  x  100
for repayment
The  arrears  rate  is  equat  to 100%  minus  the  repayment  rate. For  the  Grarmeen  Bank  arrears  statistics  are
pubtished  in  two forms: (a)  the  proportion  of loan  recipients  who  had  not  paid  back  their  entire  loan  after
one  year  (the  standard  term  of a Grameen  Bank  toan);  (b)  the  standard  arrears  rate  which  is  described  as a
"regularity  of repayment index.
Sources: For  SFDP: Agricultural  Development  Bank  of  Nepal  (1986b),  TabLe  IV.  For  Grameen  Bank:  Hussain
1984,  Table  111  .14  and 111.15. Supplemented  by Grameen  Bank. Annual  Report  1985. Dhaka  1986  cited  in
Mosley  and  Dahal  (1987:51).- 33 -
Table /  Profit and loss accounts. 1984-86
As share of loans and
Amount  advances
I  tem  1984  1985  1986  1984  1985  1986
(TK  million)  (percent)
Income  35.38  65.69  89.90  19.9  26.7  27.1




term deposits)  11.99  30.13  45.99  6.8  12.2  13.9
Expenditures  31.13  65.27  90.99  17.5  26.5  27.4
Cost of funds for
loan operation  8.10  14.19  11.94  4.6  5.7  3.6
Cost of funds for
other operations  7.86  15.43  19.09  4.4  6.3  5.8
Cost of administra-
tion of loan
operation  15.17  35.65  59.96  8.6  14.5  18.1
Profits  4.90  0.46  -0.75  2.8  0.2  -0.2
Loan operations  0.12  -14.28  -27.99  0.1  -5.8  -8.4
Other operations  4.13  14.70  26.90  2.3  6.0  8.1
Sundry income  0.65  0.05  0.34  0.4  ..  0.1
Sources:  Grameen Bank, Annual Report, 1984-86;  Mahabub Hossain (February 1988).- 34  -
knowledge about borrowers' working environment--fcrces them to put heavy
financial demands or goverrnent to compensate for the bad debt.12 Second,
investment in institutional development activities  has allowed Grameen to be
highly successful in targeting low income,  disadvantaged groups--particularly
women, who are usually missed by traditional  credit schemes.  For Grameen,
this group is defined as persons belonging to  households that own less than
0.5 acre of cultivable land.  A 1985 field survey of 975 randomly selected
borrowers showed that only 4.2 percent of the borrowers belonged to nontarget-
group households (Hossain 1988:44).
It is also important  to point up that institutional investments
can have declining cost structures  which may justify Grameen's access to
subsidized credit.  Start up costs have accounted for over half of Grameen's
administrative costs.  Banks that have been in operation from six months to a
year have had expenses that account for 16.2 percent ot outstanding loans.
After banks have been in operation for  more than three years, this figure
drops to 5.7 percent (see  Table 8).
There are an additional set of non-financial  benefits, or positive
externalities, that are associated  with institutional  intervent!ons that are
difficult to quantify.  For Grameen, credit has served as a catalyst for
12  Mosley and Dahal argue that if ti  e credit institutions  he analyses
were to charge an interest rate to borrowers that covered the cost of their
bad debt:  Grameen would have to charge 19% as opposed to the 16% it currently
charges, SFDP would have to charge 28%, and farm credit institutions  would
have to charge 88%.  These figures  are based on the following formula:
(i+a+R)  - interest  rate that  will cover costs
1-p
p  the probability of financial loss
a - administrative  costs
i - the interest rate charged to banks which is estimated to be 10%- 35  -
Table  8  Unit  costs  of operation  of bank branches,  by age  of branch,  1984/5
Amount  of  Expenses  as
loans  out-  share  of
Salary  and  Other  Total  standing  w/  outstanding
Age  of branch  Allowances  expenses  expenses  borrowers  loans
(Tk thousand)
Up to 6 months  30.8  9.6  40.4  165  24.5
6 months  to 1.0 year  46.0  13.0  59.0  365  16.2
1.0-1.5  years  72.8  15.8  88.6  1,041  8.5
1.5-2.0  years  87.8  17.8  105.6  1,576  6.7
2.0-2.5  years  94.0  19.6  113.6  2,015  5.6
2.5-3.0  years  100.8  18.8  119.6  2,198  5.4
More  than  3.0 years  107.6  20.8  128.4  2,259  5.7
Source:  M. Hossain  (1988)- 36 -
broader interventions (llossain  1988:27).  It  has introduced "Sixteen
Decisions" which are aimed at trying improve  poor people's quality of life
through such things as investment in the improvement  for housing and education
of children, use of latrires and safe  drinking water for better health, and
rejection of dowry in marriages.  Many of these interventions are also aimed
at trying to improve  poor people's perception of themselves in society by, for
example, eliminating dowry and increasing  their  access to information and
income generating potential.  These considerable social and psychological
benefits accompany programs that  emphasize socially oriented activities such
as participation, groups organizing, and local resource mobilization.  Yet
these are usually left out of cost benefit analyses since it is difficult to
quantify the benefits of, for example, reductions in the incidence of dowry.
These cases should not suggest that investing in ID will always
produce higher private rates of return.  Indeed, the credit and irrigation
sub-sectors may be especially  well-suited for ID investment.  They have
clearly identifiable  users and benefits, and therefore, are less prone to
problems of collective action (for  example, free ridership) (Uphoff 1986b:26).
This probably reduces administration  costs.  In sub-sectors such as forestry
or rangeland management, however, where beneficiaries and resources are more
difficult to identify and distribute (Uphoff  1986b:23-29), the returns to ID
investment may decrease as group organizing and management costs increase.
Whether these financial and administrative  costs outweigh the benefits will
vary sectorally and regionally.- 37
SCALE
One of the main arguments against institutional  development
strategies is that they cannot be scaled  uip  to reach large numbers of poor
people without sacrificing their effectiveness and participatery elements.
There is growing experience, however, that this tradeoff  may be more relevant
among certain types of organizations than it is in others.  Moreover, many of
the private, nongovernmental, and public institutional  examples cited in this
essay are not particularly small and have expanded into  nationwide, or
regionwide programs.
In her review of Livelihood, Employment,  and Income Generation
.longovernmental  Organizations (NGOs),  Judith Tendler (1987:38) describes how
the low impact and lack of replication  of some NGO programs has to do with
certain "diseconomies of scale" affecting their expansion.  These diseconomies
take the following form:  a) NGOs that rely on local ethnic, religious, or
other social homogeneity for success cannot be expanded easily; b) since NGOs
compete for funding they seek to "differentiate  their product" from
"competitors", which acts as a strong disircentive for exchanging ideas; c)
because of conflicting objectives--real  or perceived, the potential for
government/NGO cooperation and interaction  may be limited; and d) NGOs do not
face pressures to reach large numbers of persons, in contrast to the public
sector that must respond to public opinion.
As a result of these diseconc.ies,  Tendler concludes that the path
to replication of successful NGO experiments to nationwide pilblems of poverty
and unemployment can be quite limited.  This does not mean, however, that a
large number of small and medium scale NGOs could not have a large impact in
the  aggregate.  For example, 44 percent of farmers in Zimbabwe belong to some- 38 -
kind of voluntarv organization (Bratton  1986:122).  .Moreover,  there is growing
iricidence  of government, private sector,  and NGO coordination arid  cooperation
which has allowed NGOs to have a more significant impact.  For example,  the
Zimbabwean Savings and Development Foundation (SDF)  works with ministries and
private firms to support increased  agricultural  production to reach an
estimated 250,000 small-holders,  most of whom are women (Brown and Korten
1989:21).  (For a more detailed discussion  of SDF see Annex 4)
Other kinds of pro-poor institutions  have also achieved
significant scales.  Large institutions  that are effective at reaching the
poor are frequently decentralized,  however, particularly when they are doing
more than service delivery activities.  This decentralization can be a
critical part of their success.  In the public sector Badan Kredit Kecamata
(BKK)  credit program in Indonesia, for  example, each local BKK bank is an
independent unit, not a bank branch.  Regional development banks supervise,
but do not run, the local  units.  Through this arrangement, the BKK has
succeeded in servicing 35  percent of central  Java's 8,500 villages with almost
500 subdistrict BKK units and 3,000 village outposts (WDR 1989:120).
COMPATIBILITY WITH TRADITIONAL PROJECT FRAMEWORKS
Although analysis of institutional  aspects of poverty reduction
has received increased attention over the last few years, it is probably fair
to say that institutional development  has been less successful in making in-
roads into project implementation  and design (Chopra  1989:15).  This lag stems
in part from the fact ID requires some alterations in the way projects are
traditionally conceptualized, implemented,  evaluated, and funded.  But this
does not imply ttuat  projects, per se, are incompatible  with ID.  Indeed, the- 39  -
USAID ARIES13 project supports ID by providing resources to intermediate
institutions to enhance their capacity to serve small anid  micro-
entrepreneurs, and many examples of  additional successful ID projects are
cited in this paper.  Nevertheless, the four issues  highlighted below continue
to prevent institutional development interventions  from becoming integral
components of many poverty projects.
First, institutional  development requires a relatively long-term
perspective (Chopra 1989:15-16).  ID projects may be initiated in traditional
four to seven year project time frames,  but this is rarely long enough to
achieve institutionalization, especially  when interventions  are intended to
change behavior (for  example, involving  women in agricultural expenditure) or
performance incentives (for example, bureaucratic reorientation).
Considerable progress can be made in a short period, however.  Significant
improvements in  water distribution  and operations and management were made in
the Gal Oya irrigation  project in the first three  years.  But, project
designers and implementers should not expect a revamped, committed, pro-poor
Irrigation Ministry after only seven years.  They should expect to see a
transforming bureaucracy.  As the  NIA experience suggests, there may be some
advantages to experimenting first in  pilot areas (1975 to 1979) and then
expanding to a larger scale  based on that experience (by  mid-1986 NIAs
participatory program covered 35,000  hectares in sixty-eight provincial
offices up from twenty-four in 1981).
Second, many projects use blueprint design methods.  Yet the
learning process approach, critical to many institutional  investments,
13 ARIES stands for  Assistance to Resource Institutions for Enterprise
Support.- 40  -
requires that there be mechanisms for feedback to allow project clesigns  to
evolve and change.  For example, one of the issues raised by the World Bank's
Operations and Evaluation Department in their review of rural development
projects (World Bank 1988:51) was the restrictiveness of the traditional
project appraisal process.  This blueprint procedure tends to be inflexible;
implementers adhere to project designs which may not accurately reflect local
conditions.  The OED suggests that although the need for a definitive
appraisal is associated with the  banking and "bankability"  notion of
financing, it  may be at odds with some realities of sustainable rural
development.  In contrast, they  present an alternative to the one-time
appraisal which allows for continued appraisal and reappraisal.  This learning
process approach has had considerable success in the World Bank-assisted Aga
Khan Rural Support Program in the Northern Pakistan.
Third, donors face considerable pressure to disburse funds.  But
over-funding can undermine ID initiatives  when institutions attempt to expand
too quickly beyond their organizational  and management capacities.  For
example, when the Voluntary Agencies Development Assistance (VADA),  a Kenyan
NGO, received a $12 million dollar grant from a bilateral donor, the
organization's staff were diverted from delivery of management services for
rural development to devising internal  management procedures to satisfy donor
demand for financial oversight (Bratton  1988:19).
Fourth, evaluating and designing ID can be a complicated
undertaking.  Results may be neither immediate  nor quantifiable making
assessment difficult.  Moreover, how does one, for e-.ample,  document the
benefits of, or design a well-trained, committed, effective manager?  Yet
these qualitative features are critical to project effectiveness (USAID- 41  -
1989a:72).  Primarily for these four reasons--the need for a longer term
perspective, the tendency to use blueprint designs, the pressures to disburse
money, and the complications ID poses for evaluation and design--mainstream
poverty-oriented projects have rarely incorporated ID interventions in a
systematic way.
DECENTRALIZATION
The centralized/decentralizedl 4 dichotomy frequently  posited in
development management is  misleading.  Some pro-poor institutional development
activities can be quite centralized (for  example, building central power
systems) while others may be highly decentralized (for example, local level
NGO activity in group organizing).  But for most programs, a combination of
central and local level input  will be required.  For example, resources
accumulated locally will probably have to accompany training, funding, and
technical assistance provided centrally for effective sustainable poverty
reduction.  The limitations  of using strictly local funds is exemplified in
the case of North Yemen.  When the central government,  motivated primarily by
budget constraints, transferred development  administration to Local
Development Association (LDAs),  only limited objectives were achieved.  The
LDA could only handle very simple projects, once projects were expanded they
failed because of lack of sufficient  training and technical skills that
14  Traditionally, decentralization  has referred to a devolution of power
from the central government to local authorities  or a deconcentration of power
from central administrators to local level civil servants or semi-autonomous
government agencies.  In addition, it sometimes refers to the process of
allowing non-governmental and/or private organizations to channel resources to
local levels.  See Uphoff (1986b:221-227)  and Leonard (1982:28-34) for
paradigms of decentralization.- 42  -
potentially could be provided by central authorities (Hage and Finsterbusch
1987:207-213).
The problem, then is to identify  what combinations of central and
local support are required and how the responsibilities  between the two should
be allocated (Bryant and White, 1982:155-157).  Under this type of scenario
what is needed is not power for either central government or local
organizations but complementary strength in  both (Leonard 1982a:193).  Many of
the examples used in this paper (for  example, the NIA and Gal Oya irrigation
schemes, the Grameen and BKK Banks, the Saving Development Foundation of
Zimbabwe, and the rural water supply projects in Kenya and Malawi),
demonstrate potential for and effectiveness of complementary and coordinated
central, intermediate, and local efforts.  Decentralization may pose political
as well as administrative problems for governments.  The political feasibility
of ID is discussed below.
POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
ID is not inherently threatening  to governments for it does not
overtly redistribute wealth like land reform policies do.  But the political
ramifications of a development strategy that promotes institutional  pluralism
and local level representation  may make it unpalatable for some governments or
local elites because it could alter local and national power structures.  One
need not look far to find cases of government repression of participatory
grassroots organizations (for  example, the Ruvuma Development Association, a
grassroots NGO forced to liquidate  by the Rwandan State) or local elite
usurpation of benefit. supposedly targeted  for the poor (the  outcome a
significant proportion of small farmer credit schemes).- 43  -
Institutional  development initiatives  could, however, increase
political parties' or governments' constituencies  by bringing more people into
the political process.  This, in turn, can improve  parties' and governments'
chances for maintaining or gaining access to power.  Evidence of parties that
seek to broaden their support  base by including  the poor are plentiful in
competitive political systems.  Examples include the British Conservative
Party's courting of blue collar workers by enfranchising them in the electoral
reform of 1867 which contributed to Conservative  electoral victories in the
latter part of the 19th century; Rajiv Gandhi's recent efforts to strengthen
the system of Panchayati Raj which is  meant to devolve power to village level
councils; and efforts by the Christian  Democrats in Guatemala to recruit
support from the Rural Labor Unions.  In addition, governments can get a lot
of political mileage out of policies that appear to  help the poor and incrpase
participation (Tendler 1989:139-141).  Therefore, ID  may actually seem
attractive to governments seeking to increase their support base.
Moreover, although poverty-oriented  ID requires decentralizing
administration, it does not necessary demand devolution of power from the
central government (Leonard  and Marshall, 1982).  For example, the
decentralized and influential Kenyan Tea Development  Authority has not wrested
power away from the central government (Lamb  and Muller, 1982) any more than
the community development movement in Korea reduced President Park's national
control (Yoon 1985).  Whether governments fully grasp ID's political potential
or are able to decentralize without devolving,  however, is an unanswered
question.
It is also important to recognize the serious political and
economic costs associated with anti-Door development.  First, the poor can- 44  -
exit either physically or economically from society which can have deleterious
consequences for political leadership.  In Ghana between 1970-1980, for
example, destructive pricing and institutional  policies led farmers to either
leave the country (many found refuge in  Nigeria only to be ousted in 1982 when
oil prices dropped) or revert  back to near-subsistence  agriculture.  This led
first to a dramatic drop in agricultural  output and government revenues and
then to a successful coup d'etat.
Second, the poor are increasingly  finding new means for political
expression which are difficult for governments to ignore.  In his article,
What is not the Same About the Urban Poor, Sheldon Annis describes the
political movements that have risen from the urban slums and created a real
bartering structure through which the poor can engage the state (Annis
1988:143).  The most recent example of the poor's political leverage in Mexico
City is led by a Robinhood-like character  called Superbarrio who, dressed in
yellow tights and a red-cape, gains concessions from government with media and
poor urban slum dweller support.
Third, there is evidence that capricious terrorism is also
becoming a weapon of the poor and giving national or local leaders some cause
for concern as evidenced by the NPA in the Philippines, the JVP in Sri Lanka,
and the Naxalites in Eastern India.  Given the political possibilities that
accompany ID strategies and the potentially damaging consequences of ignoring
the poor, ID may be politically feasible.- 45  -
IV.  SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has attempted to demonstrate three main points.  First,
institutional development is critical to effective, sustainable poverty
reduction and growth.  This statement is  based on development experience which
strongly suggests that economic policies alone cannot overcome the economic,
political, and cultural hurdles that prevent resources from adequately
reaching the poor, and development interventions  that ignore institutional
considerations are often unsustainable.
Second, although there is  no one model for poverty-oriented ID and
ID initiatives will vary considerably  cross-sectorally and cross-nationally, a
number of important lessons have been learned  about successful institutional
development initiatives  which can be delineated as six broad components.  They
include elements that are concerned with countries'  broad institutional
structures--forming or strengthening local institutions and supporting
institutional pluralism and components that describe specific institutional
characteristics--institutional linkages, organizational structure and
managerial leadership, the learning process approach, and participation and
local resource mobilization.  These components emphasize flexibility,
adaptability, and the need for poor peoples' involvement in programming.
Third, the paper has argued that although ID initiatives  have
faced considerable criticisms of cost, scale, compatibility with traditional
project frameworks, decentralization,  and political feasibility, these
objections may be unwarranted or overly skeptical of ID's viability and
potential.  The paper uses case studies from different productive sectors and
sub-sectors to support these propositions,  and to illustrate what the various
components look like in practice.- 46  -
Governments that are willing to encourage this  kind of competition
and coordination among institutions  are much more likely to endorse the ID
interventions suggested above than those that pref'er  to maintain exclusive
control over poverty programs.  Although some of the newly industrializing
countries achieved rapid growth by combining central level planning and
decision-making with local resources, there are a number of features unique to
the NIC experience which would make replication  difficult in, for example,
Latin America or Africa.  In contrast, many countries that have pursued "top
down" development have faced heavy economic and political costs as a result,
especially in the productive sectors.
Poor people are not merely passive recipients of government
policy:  they respond strongly to incentives  and disincentives which should
cause nonpoverty oriented governments some cause for concern.  Given these
realities, from both a political and an economic perspective, poverty-oriented
institutional interventions should figure  centrally in development that
promotes poverty reduction.- 47 -
ANNEX 1
World Barik  Fiiidings  on Institutions  and Sustainability
Evidernce  from impact  evaluations (IE)--evaluations  done
appropriately five years after project completion--demonstrates the costs of
not investing in indigenous institution.  When IEs were undertaken on twenty-
15 five agriculture and rural development  projects  ,  evaluators found that only
twelve out of the twentr-five appeared to have successfully achieved long-
term sustainability (World  Bank 1985).16  In "Farmer  Organizations and
Institution Building for Sustainable Development"  Michael Cernea (1987)
analyzes this data and illustrates  the strong association that exists between
economic sustainability and institutional  development and the need for
organizational structures at the farmers level.  He finds that in the projects
which failed to achieved sustainability, institutional  development objectives
were notably lacking from the outset in the  project design.  Conversely, the
sustainable projects had in common a clear attempt by design, to enhance the
institutional capacity in some form.
This contrast is exemplified by two World Bank assisted projects,
the Muda Irrigation Project in Malaysia and the Hinvi Agricultural Development
Project in Benin.  In the Muda Irrigation  project, careful and patient efforts
were made to build local  water users' organizations.  The project took into
15  The 25 projects were composed of: irrigation (8), livestock (2),
perennial crops (5), area development (4), land settlement (2), forestry (2),
and agricultural credit (2).
16  Sustainability was defined economically to mean the maintenance of an
acceptable net flow of benefits from the  project's investments after its
completion ie. after the project ceased to receive  World Bank financial and
technical support.  The standard for determining economic sustainability has
been to assess whether the economic rate  of return (ERR)  was equal to, or
greater than, the opportunity cost of capital.- 48 -
account farmers' resource needs, their  willingness to cooperate, and the
pthysical  location of their plots as the criterion for owner association.  The
evaluation concluded that the project's success In increasing its flow of
benefits during the post-completion period was attributed more to grassroots
instit.utional  development and to  endurance of farmers' users' organizations
than to any other single cause.
In contrast, the negative rate of return at the time of the impact
evaluation of the Hinvi Agricultural Development Project was basically caused
by the disintegration of a cooperative network that had been designed as the
institutional support for project-prompted  activities.  The networks broke
down because the cooperatives imposed  on farmers  by a parastatal and capacity
for local management was not established.  The technical/agricultural package
financed and promoted through the project failed to take account of the
socioeconomic practices, the traditional land tenure  systems, and the cultural
behavior of the area farmers.  The farmers opposed the organizational
arrangements imposed upon them, and when these  collapsed, the technical
innovation (cultivation of palm oil) collapsed as well.  By 1983, seven years
after project completion, more than 74 percent of the membership had opted out
of the system, refusing to work in  cooperative blocks.  The farmers returned
to cultivating food crops for subsistenca and the project's investments were
largely lost.
A similar conclusion was derived from a settlement project in
Senegal's Terres Neuves, which created several  new settlements.  Although the
new settlements did achieve temporary increases in settler income levels, the
overall results were less than expected.  The unsustainable outcome was traced
to the fact that the settlers did not establish their own organization in the- 49 -
new settlement.  When the strong and active executing agency withdrew from the
area f'ollowing  completion, it left an "organizational  vacuum" that the
national level institutions could not fill.  As a consequence, growing
settlement area needs and for services (for  example, input distribution,
credit, marketing, and maintenance) were not met.  Since the settlers had not
established local organizations there  was no institution to take over these
functions.  The project had not been concerned with organizational development
measures to create the capacity necessary for self-sustained  management of the
technical packages proposed for the area.  As a result, the main technical and
economic objects--increasing production through the introduction  of intensive
farming techniques and by diversifying the traditional cropping pattern--were
not achieved on a continuing basis.- 50  -
ANNEX 2
Farmer/Agricultural Research/Lxtension Linkages
Recognizing the need for linkages, the World Bank has worked to
set up the Training and Visit (T&V)  system  with the hopes of fulfilling a
number of important objectives.  They include: a) establishing a clear line of
command from the head of the agricultural  ministry down to the field extension
staff; b)  ensuring that  village extension  workers (VEW)  work on extending a
set of simple messages developed by the resedrch  establishment to guide each
field season's crop production--emphasis  has beei placed on regular visits to
"contact farmers" in villages; and c)  institutionalizing  a strong and direct
linkage between agricultural research  and extension  by matching the research-
to-farmer extension process with a farmer-to-researcher  feedback loop.17
In India the revised agricultural  extension system, now operative
in 17 states, has by and large been able to achieve two major objectives,
establishing direct lines of command and delivering  messages.  These
objectives are dependent on the efficient functioning  of control linkages (for
example, delivery of inputs).  They require that information  from the center
(or research station) actually reaches the farmers.  These type of linkages
are sufficient for delivering technologies that are robust and usable in a
wide range of conditions (for example, some  handpumps and high yielding crop
varieties).  But they are inappropriate  for other technologies that require
two-way information flows between farmers to researchers (that is,
17  See Daniel Benor and Michael Baxter,  Training and Visit Extension,
(Washington D.C.:International  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development,
1984).- 51  -
technologies are dependent on location-specific  information for their
development).
The T&V system in India  has been relatively less successful in
achieving the hoped for feedback loop  where VEWs would relay farmers' problems
back to the scientists and thereby influence  the -esearch  agenda towards
solutions to location specAfic problems.  This results, in part, from the fact
that the system has as yet been unable to develop strong responsive
mechanisms, or assistance linkages (for  example, representation), that
communicate farmers' problems to reseerchers.  Since most technologies
developed by the research establishment and deliveree through extension tend
to be for irrigated conditions  with little  attention to production costs or to
the role of the particular crop in the overall farming system, pool  small and
marginal farmers cultivating rainfed land  benefit the least from these
technologies (Womren  in Development Division 1989a:60).
The poor may, in some instances,  gain more from farring systems
research (FSR)  which gives greater emphasis to farmers input into the
development of appropriate technologies (assistance  linkages).  Farming
systems research is holistic: it takes into consideration the entire farming
system  .hich  includes, for example, the availability of inputs, cropping
patterns, and the heterogeneity of resources employed (for example, land may
be differentiated by quality, or labor may be provided by men, women, and
children).  FSR requires on-farm research  and experiment station research.  A
two-way information flow should exist between on-farm research and experiment
station research since information  generated  by on-farm research is important
for guiding experiment-station research (CIMMYT  Economic Staff 1984:368).  For
example, information about farmers'  circumstances from on-farm experiments may- 52  -
indicate the variety that performs  well under local conditions and that meets
farmers' preferences for  varietal maturity, yield, storage quality, and
cooking quality.  In FSR, therefore, the focus is on linkages between farmers
and researchers that allows for the representation  of the farmers' interest.
It is not on tight control over experimentation.  Indeed, FSR trades control
for relevance to local conditions to an extent that is unusual in traditional
research (Anderson, 1988:41'.
One example of farming system research that takes into
consideration cropping patterns, heterogeneity of labor force (in this case,
women farmers) and local community groups  with positive consequences for
productivity is the Rural Women's Agricultural Development Project in Bihar,
one of India's poorest states.  In this  project the Bisra Agricultural
University ha.s  deployed Women Project Development  Officers (WPDOs) to work in
close coordination with the University's Farming Systems Research Project.
Since the aim of the FSR project is to find  ways to improve the income of the
poor tribal families in the drought-prone  Chotanagpur plateau, the WPDOs focus
their work on ways to enhance the agricultural  productivity of the tribal
women.  From tribal backgrounds themselves  and already trained to the post-
graduate level at the Xavier Institute  of Social Sciences, the WPDOs receive
further training to improve their knowledge of agriculture and have served as
a vital sources of feedback to the scientists  at Bisra Agricultural
University.  Extending new technologies  suggested  by the scientists to Mahila
Mandals (women's groups) established in each village, the WPDOs have helped
the women take up lucrative  vegetable gardening using simple dug wells to
provide irrigation during the dry season.  A study of farming families covered
by the program shows an increase in cropping intensity to almost 50 percent- 5  3 -
between 1981 and 1987.  Annual household income  has increased five-fold--from
an dverage of Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 14,990--in  the same period (Singh and Baha,




The need for participation in programs requiring collective action
is dramatically illustrated in the Gal Oya irrigation system in Sri Lanka.
The introduction of participatory irrigation  associations in this project
helped to transform a conflict-ridden  resettlement scheme and a run-down
irrigation system that served few downstream farmers, into a more cohesive
farming community which cooperated  with each other and with engineers for
effective water distribution and canal maintenance over a much broader area,
almost doubling water use efficiency (Uphoff, 1987:201-219).  This effort,
funded by USAID, built on experience in introducing  participatory irrigation
management in the Philippines.
2. Credit
Malawi also offers a striking example of participation in credit,
which indicates that the functioning  of credit cooperative depends upon the
way the system is organized and promoted.  In response to the complete
breakdown of their multipurpose, top-down, cooperative system, the Malawian
government launched a group lending  program based on the Grameen Bank model of
group lending which has resulted in  one of the most successful programs of its
kind (Fedor and Huppi 1989:30).
The Working Women's Forum cooperative in  Madras India, is totally
managed by the members themselves  who act as shareholders and directors.
Anyone interested in joining the forum  must become a member of a neighborhood
loan group which are made up of 10-20  women.  Forum members and staff
continually hold group meeting and discussions to acquaint women with the- 55 -
program.  A usual pattern is for a potential leader to approach a Forum staff
member.  She is told to bring together a group of 10-20 women and explain to
them how the forum works.  When a sufficient  number have committed themselves,
they elect a leader.  Once a neighborhood group is organized it is registered
with the Forum.  Each member then files an individual  application form and
pays a membership fee (Chen:6-7).  Members are required to attend group
meetings, repay loans consistently, and act as a mutual guarantor for the
loans of all group members.  Under this system the  WWF has been able to
achieve a recovery rate of between 90 and 95%, which can be contrasted with
the national average for commercial  banks of only 30-40% (Arunachalam:5).- 56  -
ANNEX 4
Saving and investment with NGO. private and public cooperation
The Saving and Development Foundation (SDF)  of Zimbabwe pioneered
a simple method of savings small amounts of money by households organized into
neighborhood groups and devised a financial  record-keeping system accessible
to non-literate people.  As a result, groups  members--numbering about 250,000
in 1985--now save enough money to place bulk orders for fertilizer and seed.
Rural women thereby increase their financial independence  and modernize their
farming skills.
The partnership involves  the Ministry of Community Development and
Women's Affairs, whose field staff are trained by SDF to teach the saving
methodology and the Ministry of Agriculture,  who extension agents are linked
by SDF to groups that require technical services.  The partnership has also
Involved a private fertilizer company to finance the  production of training
materials.  The company's sales to peasant farmers  have increased as a
consequence of increased savings.  By the mid-Eighties this innovative, low-
cost, and participatory approach to raising agricultural production among the
rural poor had become firmly institutionalized  in Zimbabwe as a trilateral
partnership between the public, private, and voluntary sectors.* 57  -
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